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Abstract While government mandates and programs con-
tinue to expand to meet the increasing challenges of disaster 
management, there is growing recognition that government 
cannot do it all alone. This has led to a quest to better under-
stand local capacities, through partnerships with the private 
sector and volunteer organizations but also in relation to 
individual citizens. The Federal Emergency Management 
Agency’s (FEMA) recent Whole Community initiative consti-
tutes a policy shift towards more local engagement and 
responsibility. However, before devising strategies to better 
engage and support various actors, the nature of their disaster 
management resources needs to be more clearly understood. 
What disaster management resources do communities sup-
ply? This case study examined the assets of one community 
group, the farm community in Sussex County, Delaware. The 
conceptual framework was based on a community asset 
approach, which currently recognizes eight types of commu-
nity capital and is comprised of active, inactive, positive, and 
negative resources. The study found a striking discrepancy 
between actually used and perceived community resources. 
Farm community resources were primarily used for implemen-
tation activities during disaster preparedness. The types of 
resources used fell into three broad categories: equipment/
supplies; experience/lessons learned; and access to other 
community and professional networks. The findings highlighte d 
the use of four community capitals—human, social, physical, 
financial—and the existence of active, inactive, negative, and 
positive resources. Tools currently employed to register com-
munity resources, such as the National Incident Management 
System (NIMS) resource inventory management for rural 
communities, are designed for professional emergency 
services but do not recognize the full range of potentially 
relevant community assets.
Keywords community assets, Delaware, disaster manage-
ment resources, FEMA, NIMS
1 Introduction
Statistics show that disaster losses and the number of 
complex disasters are on the rise in the United States, as in the 
rest of the world (Board on Natural Disasters 1999; Cutter 
and Emrich 2005; UN 2011). The United States government 
acknowledges that it cannot meet these challenges alone 
(DHS 2009). One of the recent initiatives of the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is the Whole 
Community approach. While policies are still in the develop-
ment stage, FEMA (2011, 3) understands it to be 
a means by which residents, emergency management practi-
tioners, organizational and community leaders, and govern-
ment officials can collectively understand and assess the 
needs of their respective communities and determine the best 
ways to organize and strengthen their assets, capacities, and 
interests.
In developing the Whole Community concept, FEMA 
explains that understanding community capabilities is one of 
the challenges (FEMA 2011). In order to effectively engage 
diverse groups in disaster management, information about the 
availability of all resources from every stakeholder is critical. 
While government already collaborates closely with the 
voluntary sector and also increasingly and more comprehen-
sively with the private sector, we know little about the 
resources of the rest of the community—of individual citizens 
and the range of community groups that it comprises. Apart 
from maintaining a roster of those who, for example, have 
had first aid training or are members of a Community 
Emergency Response Team (CERT), what other resources do 
community members possess that can contribute to disaster 
management? And how do they understand their own disaster 
management resources?
It is not sufficient to consider those physical assets, skills, 
and experiences, which citizens individually and community 
groups collectively have employed in the past. These may not 
be representative of all assets that exist and have the potential 
for activation. For the process of planning with community 
disaster management resources to be meaningful, it is impor-
tant to understand the full range of potential resources. Before 
attempting to devise strategies of how to tap into the currentl y 
unused or underused resources, an understanding has to be 
gained about what specific types of resources are available, 
that is, the nature of community assets that have the potential 
of contributing to disaster management. With this knowledge, 
we can then look into ways of how to best make use of 
them.
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The purpose of this case study was to further examine this 
knowledge gap of understanding community disaster man-
agement resources and contribute to the discussion on 
FEMA’s policy development of the Whole Community. The 
farm community in Sussex County, Delaware, was selected 
as an ethnographic case study. The agriculture sector has 
had experience with all types of disasters for centuries, even 
before government started assuming responsibilities and set 
up institutions to manage them. For this reason, this commu-
nity group was of particular interest. Sussex County is the 
agriculture center in the state of Delaware, and farmers 
represent a majority group in the local population.
Three specific research questions were pursued:
(1) How does the farm community in Sussex County 
perceive its own capacity to engage in disaster mitigation, 
preparedness, response, and recovery?
(2) How has the farm community in Sussex County 
employed its own resources in past disasters?
(3) How do the resources of the farm community in Sussex 
County relate to the functional areas of institutional disaster 
management?
The significance of this study is multifaceted. It intended 
to advance research by moving from a social capital to a com-
munity asset approach. Through a better understanding of the 
nature of specific community resources, a new perspective 
may also be gained for other related concepts such as disaster 
vulnerability and resilience. Better information on the nature 
of community resources may shed light on communities’ 
resilience in certain areas to withstand the impact of a disas-
ter, and it may also highlight weaknesses in terms of a lack of 
resources that will require attention. This study also hoped to 
offer a refined conceptual view of community disaster man-
agement resources and thus address FEMA’s stated challenge 
of understanding community capabilities. Society cannot 
afford to further delay where significant advances can be 
made in managing disasters—particularly through the inher-
ent resources of major stakeholders such as communities 
themselves. In the current political and economic climate, an 
expansion of government services is unlikely and unrealistic. 
The use of the Whole Community’s disaster management 
assets is needed.
2 Literature Review
In seeking answers to the three research questions, the 
literature review focused on two major bodies of literature: 
theoretical concepts of community assets; and public policy 
conceptualization of community disaster management 
resources.
2.1 The Theoretical Concepts of Community Assets
Research into community disaster management resources is 
currently seen through three distinct but closely intertwined 
lenses: social vulnerability—focused on social factors that 
create inequality and unequal access to resources for 
segments of the population and leave some more susceptible 
to the impact of disasters; resilience—focused on a commu-
nity’s positive recovery capacities and the degree to which it 
is capable of bouncing back from the effects of a disaster with 
its own resources; and social capital—one component of 
community assets that constitutes the aggregate of positive 
as well as negative community resources and represents the 
actual community capacity to cope with disasters, reflecting 
the characteristics of social vulnerability and resilience. 
Whereas early disaster research (Quarantelli and Dynes 
1971) studied social cohesion and community strength in 
terms of response capacities in times of calamities, the focus 
shifted in the late 1970s to a perspective of predisaster social 
vulnerabilities that negatively affect a community’s capacity 
to respond (O´Keefe, Westgate, and Wisner 1976; Cutter, 
Boruff, and Shirley 2003). One of the underlying views at the 
time was that the social cohesion approach was only concep-
tually appropriate for natural disasters but not sufficient to 
also adequately capture the rapid changes in society and the 
new threats of manmade and technological disasters. Propo-
nents of the vulnerability approach believed that “rather than 
leading to the emergence of solidarity, technological disasters 
have helped create a ‘corrosive community’. Blame, mutual 
recrimination and conflict are presented as the consequence 
of technologically driven disasters” (Furedi 2007, 484) that 
have led to a breakdown of social cohesion, leaving commu-
nities more vulnerable to disasters. However, a closer look at 
community behavior in actual disasters has demonstrated that 
vulnerability as a concept is not sufficient either to explain a 
community’s capacity, or lack thereof. Consequently, interest 
has returned to the broader concept of social capital and the 
development of resilience as the positive antidote to social 
vulnerability. This shift in thinking is supported by an increas-
ing body of research over the last two decades of case studies 
that have uncovered disaster myths, which have—and often 
still do—described communities and their members largely 
as victims, “vulnerable” and “panicked”—while, in fact, it is 
reportedly the solidarity of community networks and the 
courage and calmness of individuals as first responders that 
make significant—but unmeasured and largely unacknowl-
edged—contributions to search and rescue and initial 
response activities (Quarantelli and Dynes 1971; Stone 2001; 
Murphy 2007). As Dynes (2006, 2) further explained:
The vocabulary of ‘command and control’ suggests chaos 
rather than citizen adaptability and creativity [. . .] while we 
calculate damage to physical and human capital, we usually 
ignore the social capital available within communities to deal 
with emergencies. Social capital is our most significant 
resource in responding to damage caused by natural and other 
hazards, such as terrorism.
Instead of treating any of the three approaches in isolation, 
there is increasing consensus that all three in conjunction 
provide invaluable insights into a community’s capacity to 
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cope with disasters. While all three are indispensable to 
understanding community disaster management assets, the 
focus of this study was on all the possible community assets 
and factors that influence the mobilization of resources. Its 
findings suggest that—instead of focusing on social capital as 
the only community capital significant to disaster manage-
ment—a broader view of community assets recognizing all 
types of capitals may be more appropriate.
Coleman (1988, 1994) and Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 
(1993) have widely been credited with developing the 
concept of “social capital” in the early 1990s. The following 
decade saw an understanding of social capital as only one 
type of capital that together with others comprises commu-
nity assets. Currently, eight types of community capitals are 
recognized: human, social, physical, financial, environmen-
tal, political, cultural, and spiritual (Bourdieu 1986; Guest 
2007; Green and Haines 2012). This literature understands 
individual community resources to be embedded in the vari-
ous types of capital. As discussions among scientists persist 
on definitions for these different types of capital and their 
linkages and overlaps, for the purposes of this study, they are 
used and defined as follows:
(1) Human: including education, labor market experience, 
artistic development and appreciation, health, other skills and 
experiences;
(2) Social: trust, norms, social relationships and networks;
(3) Physical: possession of and capacity to maintain roads, 
buildings, railroad tracks, bridges, vacant land, and so on;
(4) Financial: access to tangible monetary assets, includ-
ing loans and credits;
(5) Environmental: natural resources—air, water, land, 
flora, and fauna;
(6) Political: access to decision making through instru-
mental (influencing policies in one’s interest) or structural 
(participatory attributes of the political system) political 
capital;
(7) Cultural: embodied, objectified, and institutionalized 
cultural assets;
(8) Spiritual: flow of ideas and values that emerge out of 
tradition and may be embodied, objectified, and institutional-
ized assets. 
Possibly because of its origin in sociology, disaster studies 
in the United States have focused on social capital, that is, 
research on community networks and relationships that are 
used pre- and postdisaster. Little research has been carried out 
in relation to other types of community capitals—let alone 
a comprehensive study of all of a community’s disaster 
management assets. 
Resources that are embedded in these different types of 
community capitals can be categorized into active, inactive, 
positive, and negative. Hyman (2008, 226), by aggregating 
the conceptual approaches of social capital as developed 
by Bourdieu (1986), Coleman (1988, 1994), Portes (1998), 
Putnam (2000), and Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti (1993), 
defines positive social capital as “an asset representing 
actionable resources that are contained in, and accessible 
through a system of relationships.” By qualifying community 
resources as “actionable” or capable of being acted upon, 
this definition recognizes not only those resources that 
have become active but also those that have the potential 
of being accessed through a system of relationships in the 
community.
Stone (2001) and Weissbourd, Bodini, and RW Ventures, 
LLC (2005) explore the importance of this broadened defini-
tion further. Stone (2001, 4–5) explains that locating and 
measuring social capital has focused, misguidedly, on “out-
comes of social capital as indicators of social capital itself.” 
Social capital has been said to exist whenever the outcome 
indicator is positive, which Stone describes as a “tautological 
fallacy.” While Stone focuses on conceptual issues of measur-
ing social capital that should not only consider outcomes but 
instead all contributing dimensions potentially leading to 
the formation of social capital, Weissbourd, Bodini, and RW 
Ventures, LLC approach the same issue through the lens of 
economics, in that “assets do not have a value per se; they are 
passive, or idle, until they are “acted on,” or leveraged by 
businesses and investors. Neighborhood assets become valu-
able only to the extent that they are deployed or incorporated 
in a market-based economic process” (2005, 8). According to 
both above findings, social capital encompasses active, that 
is, used, as well as dormant, that is, potential, community 
resources. By extension, all other types of capital should also 
comprise active and inactive resources.
There is extensive interdisciplinary research on another at-
tribute of community assets that explores its positive and 
negative characteristics. The most well-known of these is 
negative social capital. Portes (1998, 15) explains that “it is 
our sociological bias to see good things emerging out of 
sociability [. . .] However, the same mechanisms appropriable 
by individuals and groups as social capital can have other, 
less desirable consequences.” Instead of only focusing on the 
positive impact of community networks, social control, and 
collective sanctions, Portes finds that they can also lead to the 
“exclusion of outsiders, excess claims on group members, 
restrictions on individual freedoms, and downward leveling 
norms” (1998, 15), leading to what he describes as negative 
social capital. Social networks can foster an environment 
conducive to criminal behavior that leads to a deterioration of 
human capital in the form of educational underachievement, 
deteriorating physical and mental well-being, and progressive 
exclusion from the work force. This literature demonstrates 
that each type of community capital has inherent in it the 
potential for positive as well as negative actionable resources. 
It also shows how closely the various capitals impact each 
other and can trigger the activation of either positive or 
negative resources in another type of capital.
This current state of research into community assets 
(Figure 1)— “actionable resources” as developed by Hyman; 
Stone; and Weissbourd, Bodini, and RW Ventures, LLC 
as well as Portes’s “positive” and “negative” community 
resources—has helped inform the conceptual framework for 
this study.
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2.2 Public Policy Conceptualization of Community 
Disaster Management Resources
In public policy, the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) addresses rural resource management through the 
National Incident Management System (NIMS), established 
in 2003 with the aim to bring together government, private, 
and nongovernmental organizations for more coordinated 
emergency management. One of the areas of coordination is 
resource management, for which NIMS defines and uses 
eight broad categories of rural emergency management 
resources: animal health; emergency management; emergenc y 
medical services; fire/HazMat; helicopters, firefighting; law 
enforcement; public works; and search and rescue. These 
eight categories are further broken down into “kinds,” which 
include trained personnel as well as equipment and supplies, 
such as public safety dive teams, hydraulic truck cranes, and 
air curtain burners.
FEMA (2010) explains that its rural emergency resource 
management system plays a role in mitigation, preparedness, 
and response. Its resources inventory in the above eight 
categories is focused on preparedness and response. Policies 
and guidelines related to NIMS resource management do not 
explicitly state what resources are intended in what phase of 
the disaster management cycle. It is unclear if policies and 
programs related to NIMS resource management consider 
all eight categories applicable to all phases of the disaster 
management cycle. For the development of the conceptual 
framework, further literature and emergency handbooks 
(Lindell, Prater, and Perry 2007; Haddow, Bullock, and 
Coppola 2008) were reviewed.
For the purposes of this study, which intended to look at 
the community’s resources in all four phases of the disaster 
management cycle, NIMS’s eight broad categories of resource 
management were eventually juxtaposed with the typologies 
of emergency functions as summarized by Lindell, Prater, and 
Perry (2007). In order to simplify the data collection process 
and capture resources that could be provided not only by 
technical experts but also by nonprofessional community 
members with relevant experience, skills, and equipment, the 
functional areas were grouped together into four broad 
categories of activities that are relevant to all four phases of 
the disaster management cycle: assessment; coordination; 
communication/information management; and implementa-
tion/operations. For this study, they were defined as follows:
(1) Assessment: risk perception; assessing the magnitude, 
location, and timing of impact; loss and damage evaluation; 
and recommending how to respond and recover. 
(2) Coordination: the process by which relevant group 
members consult with each other internally and externally 
with the objective of agreeing on and synchronizing a joint 
course of action to ensure the most efficient use of communal 
resources in pursuit of specified objectives. 
(3) Communication/Information Management: mecha-
nisms of timely and relevant information sharing between 
group members as well as with outside actors on the nature 
of threats, events that had taken place, any action taken by 
whom, how and when, as well as information on outstanding 
needs and gaps. 
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(4) Implementation/Operations: the process of deployment 
of personnel, equipment and supplies, as well as in a broader 
sense, the application of knowledge and expertise, with the 
aim of either mitigating, preparing for, responding to, or 
recovering from a disaster event. 
Based on the literature on community assets and the public 
policy conceptualization of community resources, a three-
dimensional framework was designed with the following 
components: (1) the four phases of the disaster management 
cycle, that is, mitigation, preparedness, response, and recov-
ery; (2) perceived and actually used resources; and (3) the 
four broad categories of disaster management activities, 
that is, coordination, assessment, communication, and 
implementation. 
3 Methodology
The identification process of disaster-relevant resources in 
this farm community was carried out through a three-step 
approach. A survey was conducted that looked into (1) the 
farm community’s own perception of their disaster manage-
ment resources; (2) the actual use of their resources in 
previous disasters; and (3) how these resources related to the 
functional areas of institutionalized disaster management. It 
was important to understand in how far the perception of the 
resources by the community and their actual use coincided. 
The survey included both a questionnaire as well as in-depth 
interviews. 
The definition of “farmers” used in this study included 
anyone who worked or had worked on a farm in Sussex 
County, recognizing that there were employees, seasonal 
workers as well as family members other than the farm owner, 
who might have had valuable information for this study and, 
ideally, were able to provide multiple perspectives on the 
same events. However, for the purposes of this study, “farm-
ers” did not include those engaged in farm support services, 
such as feed or equipment providers, who fall into separate 
professional categories. The definition of “farm” used to 
locate potential respondents was borrowed from the 2007 
Census of Agriculture (USDA 2009, viii), which classifies a 
farm as “any place from which $1000 or more of agriculture 
products were produced and sold, or normally would have 
been sold, during the census year.”
In order to capture the historical context of previous disas-
ters and resources used, a combination of sampling strategies 
was employed. During Ag Week in Harrington from 16 to 21 
January 2012, a maximum variation strategy was employed 
to target participants with the widest possible range of 
experience—spatially across the county exposed to possibly 
different types of hazards but also in terms of type of farm 
operation. This was supplemented by a random sample 
survey in the five major townships: Seaford, Georgetown, 
Milford, Millsboro, and Laurel. Farmers were asked to 
complete a questionnaire and invited to a follow-up, in-depth 
interview.
The 81-question questionnaire included some basic 
community profile questions and then asked participants to 
respond to questions on their perception of farm community 
resources as well as those resources that they had actually 
employed in past disasters. The main part of the questionnaire 
was divided into four segments representing the four phases 
of the disaster management cycle: mitigation, preparedness, 
response, and recovery. Those four segments were each fur-
ther subdivided into the four functional areas: coordination, 
assessments, communication, and implementation. Two ques-
tions were attached to each functional area: one question 
about general resources for that specific functional area, and 
another more specific question on resources related to a par-
ticular activity in that disaster management phase. These two 
separate types of questions—general and exhibit—intended 
to confirm that the questions had been understood. They 
also served as an entry point for further clarification during 
the in-depth interview. Keeping in tradition with qualitative 
research, some open-ended questions were also included. 
At the end of the survey, 33 questionnaires had been 
returned completed. They represented 33 farms in 10 
locations, covering all ages, types of farming, and a diverse 
topography from inland and river to coast farming (Figure 2). 
In addition, a total of nine in-depth interviews were carried 
out. Seven of those were with farmers themselves, and two 
were conducted with Sussex County emergency services / 
Citizen Corps and a Georgetown fire company.
4 Limitations
Although the number of completed questionnaires fell within 
the expected minimum range, it largely confined the analysis 
to descriptive statistics. Finding participants after Ag Week 
in the five major townships of Sussex County also proved 
difficult. Usually, only one person per farm was available to 
complete the questionnaire, instead of the anticipated 5–10. 
This was attributed to the winter month. On arrival at a farm, 
the researcher was usually referred to the owner or manager, 
who was generally male (88% of respondents were male). 
Wives were reluctant to complete the questionnaire and 
referred to their husbands. This limited the range of perspec-
tives on farm resources to mainly male owners and managers.
There was concern among respondents that the survey was 
going to be used to “inspire” more government regulations, 
which farmers strongly object to. It took the researcher exten-
sive time to explain the project and for what purposes the data 
were going to be used. As with the survey during Ag Week in 
Harrington, it took two to three hours on average to find a 
participant and have one questionnaire completed. In addi-
tion, there seemed to be some degree of “survey fatigue.” 
Some farmers showed the researcher other questionnaires 
they had just received in the mail from various research 
institutes. 
This study was not about developing a survey tool for all 
community groups or individual citizens in Sussex County, 
who may have disaster management resources, but focused 
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Figure 2. Surveyed locations in Sussex County, Delaware
on the farm community specifically. It also did not intend to 
suggest that its findings would necessarily be applicable to 
other farm communities. Every community will have its own 
distinct set of assets and challenges and different types and 
levels of resources. It was anticipated, however, that this 
study would provide an insight into how farm communities 
understand and use their own disaster management resources 
and provide a starting point for discussion on how these 
community resources could be leveraged better. 
5 Sussex County, Delaware: Disaster 
Profile
According to historical data compiled by Sussex County 
Emergency Services, Sussex County with a total population 
of 197,145 (U.S. Census Bureau 2010) and situated on the 
Mid-Atlantic coast has experienced a wide spectrum of disas-
ters over the past 250 years: floods, severe storms, tornados, 
earthquakes, droughts, and human-made disasters such as the 
release of hazardous material (Sussex County Emergency 
Operations Center 2004; Sussex County Emergency Opera-
tions Center 2010). In 2004, Sussex County was also affected 
by an avian flu outbreak that resulted in significant economic 
losses (Amis 2007). The top 10 hazards in terms of probabil-
ity of future occurrence for the county include: release of haz-
ardous material; extreme temperature; severe thunderstorm; 
winter storm; flood; drought; wildfire; hail; earthquake; 
and tornado (Sussex County Emergency Operations Center 
2010). Exhibit questions for the questionnaire were 
designed with reference to some of the more severe events 
that affected Sussex County over the past 10 years, such as 
the 2004 avian flu outbreak, severe floods in 2006, and the 
winter storm of November 2010, with the expectation that 
more recent events would result in more comprehensive 
recollections. However, during the in-depth interviews, 
historical events as far back as Hurricane Hazel in 1954 were 
mentioned.
6 Findings
This section is organized in three parts corresponding to 
the three research questions of how the farm community 
in Sussex County perceived their disaster management 
resource s, how they used them in the past, and how their 
resources related to functional areas of institutional 
emergency management.
6.1 Perceived versus Actually Used Resources
Before delving into the specifics of the findings, a comment 
is necessary on an observation related to general and exhibit 
questions. General and exhibit questions were used in the 
questionnaire in order to ensure that questions were under-
stood, but also to better triangulate data. The responses 
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showed that there were no apparent discrepancies between 
the ratings of general and exhibit questions—with the excep-
tion of coordination activities in the preparedness phase 
(Figure 3) and assessment activities in the preparedness, 
response, and recovery phases.
For coordination in preparedness as well as assessment in 
response, answers to the exhibit question for actually used 
resources showed a positive response while the general ques-
tion did not. This indicates that the farm community in fact 
had used resources for those activities and in those phases, but 
this was not reflected in their perception. This suggests that 
there was an underestimation of resources in these areas.
Similarly, for assessment activities in both the prepared-
ness as well as the recovery phase, overall positive answers 
were received to the exhibit question on perceived resources 
but not for the general question. This suggests that the 
farm community believed that it had positive resources for 
preparedness and recovery assessment. This could not be 
confirmed through instances of actual deployment. This may 
point to either an overestimation of resources or a lack of 
opportunity to date to deploy them. It was beyond the scope 
of this study to investigate any causal relationships. This area 
requires further analysis in future studies.
These observations on general and exhibit questions were 
important for the interpretation of the aggregate data on the 
four categories of activities throughout the disaster manage-














Figure  3. Farm community resources: Preparedness/Coor-
dination in Sussex County, Delaware
Table 1. Questionnaire results in relation to the disaster management cycle in Sussex County, Delaware
Resources Mitigation Preparedness Response Recovery
General Exhibit General Exhibit General Exhibit General Exhibit
Coordination perceived 4.5 4.5 5.2 4.5 4.3 3.6 5 4.9
actually used 5 5 4.7 2.1 4.4 3.7 4.7 4.9
Assessment perceived 4.2 3.7 3.5 2.4 3 3.3 4.3 2.4
actually used 4.3 5.4 4.6 3.4 5.2 3 4 5.4
Communication perceived 3.3 3.9 3.9 3.6 3.3 4 4.4 3.6
actually used 4 4.3 3.8 3.4 3.5 3.7 4.4 4
Implementation perceived 4.5 5 2.7 2.7 2.5 2.4 3.9 3.8
actually used 2.5 2.5 2.3 5.7 4.4 4.3 3.7 4
Note: The mean scores smaller than 3 (in bold face) are interpreted as a positive response and indicating the presence of a community resource.
account below, where the mean score point of the perceived 
and actually used responses was used to arrive at the aggre-
gated results and served as the basis for the interpretation of 
the quantitative data (Table 1). They reflected answers pro-
vided to questions 18 to 81, which offered a response scale 
from 1 “strongly agree”; 2 “somewhat agree”; 3 “neutral”; 4 
“somewhat disagree”; 5 “strongly disagree”; 6 “don’t know”; 
to 7 “doesn’t apply.” Where the mean score was smaller than 
3, it was interpreted as a positive response indicating the pres-
ence of a community resource. Where the score was greater 
than 3, it was considered a negative response. 
The survey found that, overall, perceived versus self-
reported actually used resources were congruent with regard 
to the functional areas of communication and assessment. 
However, they diverged for implementation and coordina-
tion. As Figure 4 shows, the perception of available imple-
mentation resources was significantly higher during the 
preparedness and response phases than the respondents 
confirmed in their answers to the questions on the resources 
they had actually used before and after an event. Since the 
data did not offer any causal explanation, various reasons 
could account for this discrepancy, such as: the community 
had significantly more resources than it employed; the com-
munity had potential resources but had not had an opportu-
nity to activate them; or the farm community overestimated 
its implementation resources. This could not be determined 
by this study and requires further investigation. 
Another inconsistency that the survey highlighted 
concerned coordination activities in the preparedness phase 
specifically. Apparently, there was a positive identification 
of coordination resources that had been used in the past, but 
the perception of this category was negative. This seems 
to indicate an underestimation of potential coordination 
capacity, which was also revealed in the observation on 
answers to the exhibit versus general questions.
The findings of this study on perceived versus actually 
used resources of the farm community show that they over-
lapped with the exception of coordination in the preparedness 
phase, and assessment capacity in the response and recovery 
phases. Overall, in relation to the four disaster management 
phases and categories of activity, the farm community showed 
active collective engagement in implementing mitigation 



























Figure 4. Farm community resources: Implementation in 
Sussex County, Delaware
measures; implementing and coordinating disaster prepared-
ness; assessing and implementing a response; and carrying 
out assessments for recovery. 
6.2 When Resources Were Used for Collective Action
This second part takes a closer look at when farmers used 
their disaster management resources for the benefit of the 
community.
6.2.1 Coordination
The farm community in Sussex County did not use a formal 
coordination mechanism for disaster management. There 
were no formal or organized meetings convened specifically 
for disaster-related activities. Throughout the fieldwork for 
this study, farmers themselves and other stakeholders empha-
sized their independent work style and the fact that there 
was no leadership structure. Everybody assumed whatever 
function needed to be filled whenever necessary. Fire services 
explained that, when there was a field fire, farmers converged 
spontaneously to help and, depending on what needed to be 
done to contain the fire upon their arrival on the scene, they 
would immediately take on that role. There were no pre-
assigned roles and responsibilities. When functions were 
assumed, they were largely carried out independently and 
without supervision. One farmer commented that responses 
to incidents like field fires had been experienced so many 
times that farmers knew what needed to be done. This knowl-
edge and experience continued to be handed done to the next 
generations of farmers.
When there was an imminent need that could not be man-
aged by a farmer alone, farmers would informally meet to 
discuss what course of action to take. According to a number 
of respondents, farmers considered their everyday network to 
be within an approximately five-mile radius. This was what 
they considered to be their local community, where they knew 
everybody and helped each other. In advance of a snowstorm, 
they usually knew who of the farmers in the neighborhood 
would clear the roads close-by, if they did not fall under the 
responsibility of the Delaware Department of Transportation 
(DelDOT). 
Coordination with emergency services in the preparedness 
and immediate response phases was more formalized. Some 
farmers had contracts for snow removal services with 
DelDOT, which clearly laid out their responsibilities and 
coordination requirements with the government. However, 
there were other farmers, who did not wish to be bound by a 
contract but still provided equipment and assistance to local 
emergency services. In those instances, there was structured 
communication with emergency services in the same way as 
was the case for contracted farmers. On requests for assis-
tance, farmers communicated their availability. Sometimes 
they were reimbursed. However, as fire services explained, 
some declined reimbursements and, generally, the amount 
was often not commensurate with the expenses for the 
services provided.
A minority but significant number of respondents 
answered positively on questions related to collective coordi-
nation activities. For instance, 39 percent agreed that there 
was a forum to decide on mitigation measures collectively 
and some 28 percent confirmed that there was a farm repre-
sentative to lead on mitigation. While the questionnaire 
responses did not provide details on the nature of those coor-
dination fora, subsequent interviews and other information 
collected made reference to the role of the Farm Bureau, the 
Agriculture Cooperative Extension as well as other local and 
regional farm meetings, such as those organized by the Fruit 
and Vegetable Growers Association of Delaware and the 
Delmarva Poultry Industry, Inc., as venues to exchange infor-
mation and discuss mitigation strategies. However, actual 
decision-making to implement mitigation measures seemed 
to remain at an individual farm level mostly within statutory 
requirements and standards. 
The only positive results for collective coordination 
activities could be confirmed for the preparedness phase. 
Specific questions related to knowledge of equipment avail-
able in the community for specific tasks. Over 72 percent 
responded that they had knowledge of who in the community 
had road-clearing equipment that was ready to be deployed. 
The importance of knowing what equipment was available 
for emergency response was also confirmed and repeatedly 
made reference to during the interviews. 
There was no formalized coordination structure for the use 
of farm community resources throughout the entire disaster 
management cycle. There were some formal and informal 
mechanisms that became active in the preparedness stage, 
particularly where resources were deployed in support of 
efforts by local emergency services.
6.2.2 Assessment
The study found that farmers drew on previous assessments, 
knowledge, and experience to make decisions particularly 
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during the preparedness stage. They used their own lessons 
learned but also drew on outside expertise to inform their 
recovery strategies. For instance, 86 percent of farmers 
confirmed that they consulted with external farm experts on 
experiences in other regions of the United States in order to 
improve their own practices. Some 50 percent of all respon-
dents affirmed that they had sufficient resources to carry out 
their own damage assessment after a disaster.
While the questionnaire only uncovered perceived but 
not actually used assessment resources for preparedness and 
recovery, interviews confirmed actually used resources in 
both of those two phases and the response phase. The analysis 
of the qualitative data concluded that most activities were 
carried out either in preparation of an insurance claim or in 
order to modify farming practices, or rebuild farm buildings 
with more disaster-resilient technology. 
It has to be noted here that with some disaster management 
phases often running concurrently, the distinction particularly 
between recovery and mitigation activities is often blurred. 
Some recovery activities, which take into consideration les-
sons learned and best practices and in essence “build back 
better,” can equally be classified as mitigation measures, as 
illustrated by the examples of modified farming practices or 
the rebuilding of farm buildings. Assessment activities of the 
farm community can be concluded to span the entire disaster 
management cycle.
Assessment activities are also a reflection of threat percep-
tions. What resources are deployed, when, for what types of 
events and to what degree are indicators of a community’s 
risk identification. One of the researcher’s assumptions prior 
to undertaking this study had been that any farm community 
would have a risk perception more closely aligned with the 
conclusions of emergency services and would, therefore, be 
more proactive in terms of disaster mitigation and prepared-
ness than other segments of society. However, the findings of 
this study unveiled an unexpected reactive approach to disas-
ter management in general. Repeated comments ranged from: 
“Why prepare for a disaster? If it’s this bad, there is nothing 
else we can do but run”; to “Luckily we are not in the 
Mid-West or California, and don’t have to worry about that 
[tornados, earthquakes]”; and “Flooding? We don’t have any 
flooding problems in Sussex County!” Their risk assessments 
of a more severe event were low, but so was their risk percep-
tion of frequent and recurring emergencies, such as county-
wide flooding. This was a surprise as severe storms and floods 
ranked among the top five hazards both in the Sussex County 
Mitigation Plan as well as among the top five in the survey 
itself on self-reported types of events affecting farms in 
Sussex County. Less than five months prior to carrying out 
this study, Hurricane Irene had barely avoided a full hit on 
Delaware, and an earthquake with its epicenter in Virginia 
had reminded everyone that the Mid-Atlantic region, includ-
ing Delaware, was located on a ridge between two of the 
earth’s major tectonic plates. Considering that Sussex County 
is located on a sea-level plain with its highest elevation at 
74 ft (23 m) and experiences frequent and wide-spread flood-
ing, comments by respondents that they did not understand 
the survey questions related to flooding and insisted that 
Sussex County was not affected by any flooding problems or 
threats were unexpected. One person commented that, during 
bad weather, including coastal storms, she would lock herself 
into her basement, which she considered to be the safest place 
on the property. Their house was located on the coastal river 
at sea level.
Low risk perceptions were also repeated with regard to 
questions on drought issues. Droughts rank number six in the 
County Disaster Mitigation Plan but were put in first place on 
self-reported disasters affecting farms in Sussex County. Yet, 
some farmers insisted that the county did not suffer from 
drought conditions at all in Delaware, as it was located on a 
plentiful aquifer and there was “more than enough water” 
available.
On other specific questions related to assessment activi-
ties, the following answers were provided. Responding to 
whether there was a preparedness plan for residents on the 
farm, livestock, and/or crops, only 40 percent of farmers 
answered affirmatively. Only 42 percent reported that they 
had used previous experience to assess risks to their farm 
before the arrival of last year’s winter weather.
With regard to contact with emergency services during 
assessments, different experiences were reported during the 
response and recovery phases. In the immediate response 
phase, for instance, over 53 percent of farmers reported that 
they had been engaged by emergency services in some form 
in needs assessments. Examples that were mentioned related 
to reporting requirements for emergency services and insur-
ance claims. After a field fire, the farmer and the fire chief 
would conduct a damage assessment together. In one instance, 
a farmer’s prompt updates on damages and losses after a 
major storm had reportedly helped with providing the needed 
information to extend the state of emergency for the county. 
In contrast, for recovery and on the question whether the 
farm’s damage assessment after the 2006 floods fed into a 
larger recovery plan for the community, only 9 percent agreed, 
while a significant number of 41 percent said they did not 
know, and 19 percent disagreed. 
Communal channels are used to take advantage of outside 
assistance to inform recovery and mitigation strategies. Expe-
rience and lessons learned are used in the preparation phase. 
Contact with local emergency services on joint assessment 
activities is limited to the immediate response phase and then 
mainly for insurance claims.
6.2.3 Communication
Of the four categories, communication was the one that 
showed the least activity, both in the questionnaires and the 
interviews. Farm life in Sussex County, as in other places, has 
changed much over the past 50 years. Most respondents made 
reference to how an improved infrastructure in terms of 
communication technology and transportation had changed 
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the cohesiveness of community life. The reliance that used to 
exist on neighbors helping each other in a remote countryside 
did not exist anymore to the degree that it used to, and occa-
sions to congregate and exchange had become less frequent. 
For example, the tradition of taking the scrapple pot, used 
to boil hogs, from farm to farm has died out. This tradition 
used to be one of the main social events and also used to 
define one’s understanding of neighborhood. In case of an 
emergency, farmers, like anyone else, now dial 911. Accord-
ing to one respondent, there were few instances, where some-
one would run to the farm next door for help. He explained 
that his first reflex was to dial 911. Professional emergency 
services arrived quickly and there was no need to call a 
neighbor. 
The only specific question that received a positive major-
ity response related to information exchange on mitigation 
measures. Over 53 percent agreed that there was some com-
munications network in the community that they made use of 
to exchange information on mitigation measures. While no 
majority responded affirmatively to any of the other questions 
in the communications category, there were still a number of 
questions that received a high response rate. Over 41 percent 
confirmed that they had a contact list of all farmers in their 
community, but only 33 percent agreed that there was some 
communications network among farmers to communicate on 
an imminent disaster. This percentage for the preparedness 
phases increased to 43 percent on a communications network 
for farmers to exchange information on the response to a 
disaster. A communications network was clearly distinguished 
from a communications system. Only 26 percent agreed 
that they had some emergency communications system to 
exchange information with the rest of the farm community. 
This was also a conversation item during the interviews. 
Anecdotal evidence showed that farmers had informal com-
munication networks—such as the truck stop in Laurel, where 
some made their way early in the morning to hear about the 
latest news and where they found out if help was needed any-
where, or they discussed an issue that needed to be tackled 
among neighbors informally over a cup of coffee. However, 
when it came to the means by which information was 
channeled, farmers continued to use face-to-face contact or 
telephone calls. There was no emergency communications 
system per se. Many farmers used basic walkie-talkies or 
two-way radios to communicate with farm personnel for day-
to-day work in the field. These were not set up to speak with 
other farmers, and they also did not link with communication 
channels used by emergency services. When farmers worked 
with emergency services during an emergency, they—
depending on the situation and individual arrangements—
would receive a radio to communicate with the team for that 
particular deployment only.
Information exchange opportunities included farm asso-
ciation meetings and such fora as the annual Delaware Ag 
Week. The media, particularly farm newspapers such as The 
Delmarva Farmer and The Mid-Atlantic Poultry Farmer also 
played an important role in information sharing. However, 
none of these are designed to address disaster issues specifi-
cally. Farmers interviewed commented that, in relation to 
disasters, the media was one of the main sources of informa-
tion to learn about best practices, particularly with regard to 
recovery and mitigation initiatives in other places. 
One interesting finding concerned the perception of 
farmers with varying years of farming experience and their 
perception of information exchange. While one could assume 
that old established community relationships also corre-
sponded to a higher degree of perceived and actual informa-
tion exchange, the questionnaire responses dispelled that 
assumption. The majority of those who had lived or worked 
in the community for less than 20 years—as opposed to the 
average of over 40 years—responded more positively to hav-
ing a communications network and venues for information 
exchange available. Nevertheless, conversations with and 
anecdotes of farmers who had only established themselves in 
the community over less than 10 years or so highlighted their 
difficulties with integrating into this old established farm 
community. This, as the data showed, did not correspond to 
having less perceived access to the farm community’s com-
munication and information exchange channels on disaster 
management issues.
Communication and information exchange on disaster 
related activities in the farm community was ad hoc and a 
reflection of how the cohesiveness of the farm community 
had changed with institutionalized emergency services now 
generally being the first point of contact and with better infra-
structure facilitating increased mobility and self-sufficiency. 
Information sharing on recovery and mitigation strategies 
took place through more established channels, such as farm 
associations and the media.
6.2.4 Implementation
The strongest responses for perceived and actually used 
resources were received in the implementation category, 
covering all phases of the disaster management cycle with 
the exception of recovery. One of the few strongly agreed 
responses in the entire questionnaire referred to the question 
“Has the farm you are associated with learned from a previ-
ous disaster and taken measures to prevent damage and 
loss in the future?” This in essence was an implementation 
question linking recovery with mitigation. A total of 66 per-
cent answered affirmatively to this question. The distinction 
between recovery and mitigation is difficult to delineate and 
an argument could be made that this response was evidence 
of the community’s resources in both recovery as well as 
mitigation.
On specific implementation questions more than 58 
percent believed they had sufficient resources themselves to 
protect farm assets and farm residents ahead of a disaster, and 
an equal percentage confirmed a communal stock of gasoline/
diesel that would be available in the event of a disaster. 
Over 69 percent reported to have taken measures to protect 
the farm before the start of the previous winter. Moreover, 
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63 percent were confident that they had adequate resources to 
organize their own emergency response. This corresponded 
with interview responses and other field observations that the 
predominance of collective implementation activities took 
place in the immediate preparedness and response phases, 
but that also lessons learned were converted into mitigation 
measures. Preparedness activities included such measures as 
boarding up and securing farm assets on their own farms but 
also for neighbors who were in need of assistance. Mitigation 
strategies reflected those already mentioned under Assess-
ments. Examples included switching to more flood or drought 
resilient crops, the purchase of additional farm machinery 
attachments to clear roads (snowplows), and reinforcing farm 
buildings. With regard to statutory requirements, 62 percent 
of farmers had put in place additional safety measures for 
chemicals that were not legally required. 
Another important finding in the implementation category 
was that respondents decided to pool resources for the benefit 
of the whole community when individual resources had been 
exhausted, and/or the government response was too slow. 
Implementation activities by the farm community focused 
on preparedness and response but took place in all four 
phases of the disaster management cycle. Confidence in 
own implementation resources was high. Table 2 provides a 
summary overview.
6.3 What Types of Resources Were Used and How They 
Related to Institutionalized Emergency Management
This section takes a closer look at the specific nature of 
the farm community’s resources and how they relate to the 
traditional functional areas of institutionalized emergency 
management. 
The survey revealed three broad categories of disaster 
management resources: (1) equipment/supplies; (2) experi-
ence/lessons learned; and (3) access to other community and 
professional networks. An overview is provided in Figure 5.
6.3.1 Equipment/Supplies
Equipment and supplies were the most often self-reported 
resources, which farmers deployed or declared as potentially 
actionable. This mainly related to heavy farm machinery used 
for road clearing, emergency vehicle recovery, and search and 
rescue. Examples included snowplowing, accompanying fire 
engines to ensure clear and safe passage and rescue them or 
other vehicles when they get stuck, help electricity companies 
reach difficult to access areas after a storm and during power 
outages, as well as using machinery to lift heavy items and 
trapped farmers or others in need.
6.3.2 Experience/Lessons Learned
Some expertise was developed and carried forward over time 
and generations. At the same time, experiences of the same 
disasters also led to the processing of different lessons learned. 
The way in which farmers responded to a field fire was prac-
ticed behavior that hardly required instructions or communi-
cation anymore. Everyone knew what to do and assumed their 
role virtually automatically. This expertise was handed down 
to the next generation of farmers. Other disaster experiences 
led to divergent responses. For example, one farmer was so 
impressed as a young man by the impact of the 1979 snow-
storm that he decided to heavily invest in mitigation mea-
sures. He calculated that the investment would pay off in the 
long run to reduce future damages and losses. Others, who 
had experienced the same event, made a more short-term 
profit calculation that did not take into consideration larger-
scale events and losses in the future. They decided against 
investing in more resilient farm structures or additional 
equipment. Some of these farmers would then rely on their 
neighbors, who had made those investments, to assist them, 
or expect government to provide those services. This was not 
only the case for century events but also for more regular 
emergencies like snowstorms and floods.
6.3.3 Access to Other Community Networks
Instances to augment their own response capacity by access-
ing other community and professional networks were also 
observed in this study. The avian flu outbreak in 2004 pro-
vided particularly informative insights into this phenomenon. 
Those affected and quarantined were supported by, among 
others, their church community, who delivered meals and 
groceries and also provided emotional support. Local busi-
nesses, including utility companies, agreed to defer and even 
reduce payments for those particularly hard hit by the finan-
cial losses. Schools facilitated home schooling for affected 
children. The ability to access these community networks 
was considered an important response mechanism to address 
basic immediate needs. These usually took place without 
contact and coordination with local emergency service.
One farmer commented that the combination of collective 
experience as well as access to other community networks 
ensured what he called “business continuity.” In his view, 
local emergency management was sometimes “short-lived”—
with managers and other key personnel changing positions 
every few years and needing to reestablish relationships in 
the community. By contrast, the farm community and its 
approach to managing emergencies were firmly established 
Table 2. When resources were used for self-reported collec-
tive action in Sussex County, Delaware
Mitigation Preparedness Response Recovery
Coordination ⎯  ⎯ ⎯
Assessment ?   
Communication ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯
Implementation    ⎯
Note: The question mark signifies a negative aggregate mean score in the 
questionnaire responses. Some recovery activities can equally be qualified as 
a mitigation measure and may be evidence of both recovery and mitigation. 
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Figure 5. Types of farm community resources used in disaster management in Sussex County, Delaware
and easier to manage because people knew each other and 
were clear about their respective roles.
Various sections above already made reference to where at 
least two of these three categories of resources came in touch 
with the work of local emergency services. Access to other 
community or professional networks was not one of them. In 
order to gain a better understanding of how these three types 
of resources related to the traditional functional areas of 
disaster management as classified by NIMS and its categories 
of rural emergency management resources, the survey data 
was analyzed juxtaposing the three areas of the farm commu-
nity’s resources with the eight categories of NIMS (Figure 6). 
In response to the third research question “How do the 
resources of the farm community in Sussex County relate to 
the functional areas of institutional disaster management,” 
there were clear areas of contact and overlap. However, the 
categorization of professional resources as defined by NIMS 
did not facilitate an overview and understanding of all of the 
actual and potential resources of the community. 
7 Discussion
Hyman’s construct of actionable social capital and Stone, and 
Weissbourd, Bodini, and RW Ventures, LLC’s exploration of 
measurements and contributing factors leading to the forma-
tion of community assets assisted with the conceptual design 
for this study. The findings confirmed the importance they 
stressed of active versus inactive but potential community 
resources, as well as of other market forces that influence the 
deployment and scope of community resources. While other 
market forces—for example, the availability of crop insur-
ance, an expanding public emergency management system, 
and a more accessible and expansive public infrastructure 
in general—have been encountered in this study and are 
examples of how the deployment of individual and collective 
farm disaster management resources has changed, it was not 
within the scope of this study to look into the specifics of this 
decision-making process. As Weissbourd, Bodini, and RW 
Ventures, LLC (2005, 10) commented, “market environments 
have distinct dynamics and levers of change that can affect 
what gets produced for whom and where.” In order to better 
understand the phenomenon and dynamics of community 
disaster management resources, their proposition demands 
further examination. Therefore, future research may wish to 
investigate:
the discrepancies between active and inactive but 
perceived farm disaster management resources in all 
of the four phases of the disaster management cycle; 
and
the various market forces in the local disaster manage-
ment economy that influence the deployment of a farm 
community’s resources. 
In relation to Green and Haines’s (2012) conceptualization 
of community assets, four of the eight original types emerged 
as the disaster management capitals of the farm community in 
Sussex County. They were human, social, physical, and 
financial capital. The study also uncovered dormant resource s, 
as well as some that may be both positive as well as negative 
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Figure 6. Farm community resources in Sussex County, Delaware, in relation to NIMS
The community’s human capital drew on the experiences 
and skills acquired by the group while preparing for and 
responding to a disaster. It also included the demonstrated 
capacity to adapt mitigation best practices from other loca-
tions to the local context. The community’s equipment and 
supplies, which helped maintain access to the local transport 
infrastructure, represented physical capital. At the same time, 
equipment and supplies also contribute to human capital, 
that is, the physical safety of community members. Financial 
capital—the ability to overcome a disaster with one’s own 
resources but also the tapping into the social and professional 
networks of the community to receive assistance in times 
Figure 7. Farm community assets in Sussex County, Delaware
of crisis—was one of the most mentioned resources in this 
study. 
Possibly because of a lack of opportunity, but not preclud-
ing overestimation, the study also located self-reported 
dormant resources for such activities as assessments and 
implementation. This poses a pertinent question in relation to 
those policies and strategies that are intended to boost only 
those capabilities that have “proven” to work. They may 
focus on active, visible resources that have been observed 
in recurring emergencies such as in winter snowstorms. 
However, this approach overlooks the full range of potential 
community capitals, which will be tested in larger-scale 
NIMS categories of rural
emergency management resources
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national disasters and catastrophes, where the population may 
have to fend for itself for days, if not weeks. The powerful 
Tohoku earthquake and tsunami in Japan in 2011 was a stark 
reminder of this, and so is scenario planning for such issues 
as cyber terrorism and civil unrest.
The findings of this study also illustrate Portes’s (1998) 
elaboration of positive and negative community resources. 
This became particularly apparent in relation to experiences 
and information processing of risks. While a modification of 
behavior may be suitable to a particular type of hazards—
such as the use of a basement safe room during a tornado—
this may not be the best course of action for another type of 
hazard, for example, coastal flooding. In this sense, lessons 
learned could be both a positive but also a negative resource. 
Another example that was widely cited as the community’s 
primary disaster response tool was crop insurance. Although 
this is a tremendously critical mechanism to save farmers 
from financial ruin and soften the economic impact of a 
disaster, as many of the respondents to this survey explained 
in response to questions on mitigation and preparedness 
measures, they felt they did not need to think too much about 
those since they had crop insurance. The response presented 
often was that crop insurance itself was their disaster 
preparedness and mitigation strategy. This raises the issue 
whether crop insurance may be a deflection from other pre-
paredness and mitigation measures, which are not attempted 
because of the existence of subsidized insurance. Any planned 
disaster management activity should include a thorough 
analysis and understanding of its impact—positive but also 
negative—on a community’s individual resources.
The understanding of this group to perceive their local 
farm community to be within an approximately 5-mile radius 
has implications for any policy proposals that may wish to 
strengthen their capacity or connection to the institutional 
emergency management structure. The jurisdictional varia-
tions raise questions on what is to be understood by
the definition of community in the context of disaster 
management; and
how various community groups can be supported that 
are not located within congruent jurisdictions. 
As this study found, the NIMS categorization of Resource 
Inventory Management for Rural Communities did not cap-
ture all of the actionable community assets. When pursing a 
disaster management approach that is intended to encompass 
the Whole Community, as is currently pursued by FEMA, a 
reconceptualization of these categories may be helpful to 
more comprehensively acknowledge a community’s disaster 
management assets. The current categorization may be 
suitable to classify professional skills and equipment and 
supplies, but it does not facilitate the inclusion of all other 
available and potential resources. The extensive research that 
has been carried out to date on the concept of community 
assets may help inform such a process. Consideration should 
be given to reconceptualizing the NIMS categorization of 
Resource Inventory Management for Rural Communities. 
Although rapid changes in society over the last 50 years 
have noticeably affected the cohesiveness and self-sufficien-
cy of the farm community, their willingness to assist one 
another in times of immediate crisis seems undiminished. 
One respondent recounted a situation, where one farmer had 
had a bad harvest and, as a result, suffered significant finan-
cial losses that forced him to consider selling the farm. The 
respondent commented that, in the past, farmers would have 
rallied to help their neighbor out in a financial crisis like that. 
Instead, he explained, the farming business environment had 
become so intensely competitive that the farmer would 
now get a call from a neighbor not offering help but asking to 
have “first dibs” on the farm in the event it went up for sale. 
Some of these anecdotes provide insights into the changed 
cohesiveness of the farm community. This was also reflected 
in answers to some of the survey questions. For instance, 
56 percent of farmers responded that their farms themselves 
responded to a disaster, with 17 percent indicating joint 
activities by emergency services and farms together. The farm 
community collectively came in third place with 11 percent. 
At the same time, where lives and livelihoods are immedi-
ately threatened—such as in farm fires—neighbors continue 
to respond promptly and without being requested to do so. It 
was beyond the scope of this study to examine the relation-
ship of the apparent changes in the cohesiveness of the farm 
community and the conditions for deployment of disaster 
management resources to the benefit of the whole communi-
ty. This, however, is clearly an important dimension in 
understanding the phenomenon and changing nature of the 
availability of community disaster management assets. 
Extensive research in community assets related to community 
economic development and the revitalization of urban neigh-
borhoods could help establish a conceptual framework for 
monitoring the changing dynamics in community disaster 
management assets. Further research and policy develop-
ments may consider developing a framework for monitoring 
changes in a community that impact the availability of 
disaster management assets.
8 Conclusion
This study set out to investigate the nature of community 
disaster management resources. The findings are particular to 
the farming community in Sussex County, Delaware. Farm 
communities in other locations may offer some different 
responses and possess a slightly different set of community 
assets. Disaster management assets of other community 
groups are likely to be entirely different. However, the 
findings of this study offer insights into the significance of 
recognizing active as well as inactive community resources.
The first two research questions of this study queried how 
the farm community perceived and had actually used its own 
resources. The study found that there was a striking discrep-
ancy between actually used and perceived community 
resources. Out of the four broad functional categories of 
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activities—coordination, assessment, communication, imple-
mentation—perceived versus actually used resources were 
congruent for communication and assessment activities, but 
they diverged for implementation and coordination. 
Farm community resources were primarily used for imple-
mentation activities and focused on the preparedness phase of 
the disaster management cycle. The types of resources used 
by the farm community fell into three broad categories: equip-
ment/supplies; experience/lessons learned; and access to 
other community and professional networks. 
The third research question queried how the resources 
of the farming community in Sussex County related to the 
functional areas of disaster management used by institution-
alized emergency services. While there was an overlap with 
the NIMS categories of rural community emergency manage-
ment resources, they did not facilitate an overview and 
understanding of all of the actual and potential resources of 
the local community. Policy recommendations based on the 
findings of this study propose, among others, resource map-
ping strategies to uncover both active and inactive resources, 
the use of existing communication channels to reinforce 
mitigation messages and information, as well as a reconcep-
tualizing of the NIMS categories of Resource Inventory 
Management for Rural Communities to allow for the identifi-
cation of all relevant local community resources.
Community capital is only as strong as the aggregate of 
its individual capitals. Although this study did not intend to 
examine individual disaster management capital, the process 
of the study design as well as the eventual findings clearly 
showed that community assets could not be separated from 
individual capital. The stronger the individual capital, the 
more is available to share with the community as a whole. 
This recognition should question the current role of citizens 
assigned by the professional disaster management community 
as mere recipients of assistance. It also infers that the strength-
ening of formal institutional structures alone is not sufficient. 
Community and individual assets need to be boosted 
simultaneously. A Whole Community approach can only be 
successful, if the disaster management assets of the whole 
community are thoroughly understood. A community-asset 
approach to disaster management offers a comprehensive 
conceptual framework to identify the full range of actionable 
community resources. 
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